APPEARANCES:

EDWARD J. BOYD V, ESQ.,

Acting United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York

> BY: HENRY A. BRACHTL, ESQ., Assistant United States Attorney.

FRANK E. SCHWELD, ESQ., MS. ELYSE GOLDWEBER Attorneys for Housing Section, Civil Rights Division.

ROY COHN, ESQ., Attorney for Trump Management Inc. F. C. Trump and D. Trump.

THE CLERK: United States against F.C. Trump,
D. Trump and Management, Inc.

MR. BRACHTL: Your Honor, the first matter of several to which we'll be addressed this morning will be Mr. Cohen's motion, but before we get to that I would like to first introduce to the Court Frank E. Schweld, who is the Chief of the Housing Section of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, and Attorney Elyse Goldweber, also of the Housing Section of the Civil Rights Division.

With respect to the matters which are on the calendar this morning, there are three concerning this case: first, there is the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint, or in the alternative, for a more definite statement.

There is, secondly, the plaintiff's motion to compel an answer to interrogatories; and, thirdly, there is the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the defendant's counterclaim.

With respect to counsel for the government on those several matters, Ms. Goldweber will address the arguments with respect to the motion to dismiss, or in the alternative for a more definite statement, and as we think a necessary corollary to that argument,

our argument in support of our motion to compel answers to interrogatories.

At the conclusion of that argument I will have a few remarks to make in support of our application for the dismissal of the defendant's counterclaim.

MR. COHNE: Your Honor, I am afraid that I will have to be affirmative and negative with respect to this battery of distinguished legal talent from the government all by myself on all motions, but I will do my very best.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Chimen, I recognize you as a big gun, too.

MR. COMBERT: You are very kind, your Honor. I wish it was so.

Judge Neaher, I guess the best thing to do here is start at the beginning. Back in the fall one day the Trumps and the Trump organization -- well, I ought to start by telling you the Trump Management Company, which is a defendant, and Frederick Trump and his son, Donald Trump, who are associated with Trump Management, is one of the largest management and most successful and most respected management companies in this area, and I suppose in the country.

One fine day back in the late fall, without having been served with any legal papers or any such

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formality, all of a sudden the Trumps turn on the radio and heard themselves being blasted all over, pursuant to a press release issued out of the Department of Justice in Washington -- not up here -- as people who are discriminating, adopting discriminatory policies.

The next day, the bulldog editions of the Daily
News and the front page of the New York Times emblazoned
the facts for all to see and all to read, and I guess
some time thereafter the court papers finally turned up
someplace and we found out what this was all about.

I noticed in some papers submitted to your Honor it is said that somebody made or was supposed to make a phone call to somebody in the Trump organization simultaneously with the release of this press release. But what I am saying now, really, is not actionable by us at the moment, except with reference to our counterclaim which I will come to in a few minutes. I tell it to your Honor as the background as to how this whole thing started.

I know that the Eastern District and the Southern District and the Second Circuit have had things to say about this idea of these press releases being handed out in the first instance, but the fact is, and the government concedes that they did hand out

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one and they have been candid enough to attach that press release to the papers which are submitted to your Honor.

The damage done to the Trumps and the defendants here was, I suppose, something that is never going to, no matter what the outcome of this case, I suppose the damage is never going to be completely undone because you are never going to catch up with these initial headlines.

When these motions were filed, we had a somewhat reserved press conference in which we tried to contact the same people, the same representatives of the media to whom the government had distributed its press release originally, and we acquainted them with the papers we were filing in Court and Mr. Trump acquainted them with his position, which is a denial which he felt he wanted to have before the thousands of people who do business with him commercially and his tenants and banks and everybody else, have before them his position which is that the charges made and emblazoned over the front pages were without foundation. In any event, here we are where we should be, in court.

Now, Judge Neaher, the complaint in this case is one of the most unusual things I have ever seen. I must admit that in recent years I suppose my practice

has gone from between office matters and trial of criminal cases, and I frankly have not been in a civil rights case before and I must say I am amazed and confounded by some of the principles of law which the government urges apply to this type of case.

First of all as to the complaint. You have before you a motion to dismiss this complaint on the grounds it totally fails to set forth facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. It is a bare bones complaint. And we ask in the alternative, if your Honor disagrees, we of course ask you to dismiss the complaint. If your Honor should disagree, we ask that your Honor, in the alternative, dismiss it with leave to the government to file a complaint with some factual allegations in it so that the defendants are on notice with some reasonable detail as to exactly what proscribed conduct they are specifically charged with having committed.

This complaint which gave rise to all these front pages is a very short document. The only facts stated in the complaint are the names of the defendant, Trump Management and Fred and Donald Trump, and from therein, there is a verbaim recitation of the statutory language of Title 42, 3602(b) and 3601, which says that it is a violation of the Fair Housing Act, and enjoinable violation to discriminate because of race,

color or creed, and that if discriminatory policies are pursued by a landlord, this is proscribed by the Fair Housing Act and the government may apply for injunctive relief of the Court.

There is not one specific allegation in this very short complaint. They don't even give a year.

They don't even say between 1968 and 1972 at such-and-such projects operated by the Trump Organization,

blacks have been denied such-and-such, or on January 17,

1973, John Jones, being otherwise fully qualified and

able to pay the rent, applied and was denied an

apartment because of his race, whereas the same apartment

was given to a subsequent applicant, or something like

that; not one line in this whole complaint.

When Mr. Trump brought it in to me and I read it, I said, "I don't know what to tell you. It has your name and it sets forth verbatim statutory language saying you should not discriminate. And there isn't one specific act." I said, "It's akin to a defendant being indicted with the statutory section being charged and not one specific in the indictment."

Now, I realize a defendant in a criminal case could then come forward and ask the government for a bill of particulars, which is a relief the Court would grant if a situation existed as I described. In this case, something crazy happened, Judge Neaher. After this

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complaint was filed and we made the motion to dismissand I don't remember whether it was before we made the
motion or after we made the motion, and it really
isn't too material -- but, in any event, after this
complaint is filed and we set up a rumpus about it
and said, "We don't know what this is all about. We
didn't discriminate and we don't know how to tell you
we didn't because you haven't given us one thing we
can sink our teeth into; you haven't given us one
location, one name, one fact which we can answer here."

They said, "Don't worry; that's going to be taken care of." And then I find out how it will be taken care of, they serve us with 16 pages of interrogatories and tell us to go out and make an investigation to find out whether or not we discriminated, to furnish them with the answers and when we furnish them with the answers, then they will be in a position to amplify the complaint and tell us whether or not in fact the charge which they made on every front page in this area might have some substance to it or not.

Now, the third motion before your Honor this morning is to compel us to answer these interrogatories.

I'm going to say just a word about them because it would seem to me, and I don't think there will be much disagreement on that, that the first thing we do is

impose upon your Honor for a ruling, after your Honor has had a chance to go into this mess we are throwing at you, on the sufficiency of the complaint, and if your Honor rules it sufficient and does not dismiss it, or rules that they should furnish some facts and then give them time to furnish facts, once that is cleared up; then we get down, I suppose, to the stage of interrogatories and further particulars and all of that.

Now, this 16 pages of interrogatories they served on us to find out whether there is any basis for their action has to be the wildest thing I ever read in my life. Maybe it is my ignorance of this type of proceeding. On page 15, they say, "Please state the name, address, race and occupation of each person interviewed by you or on your behalf in relation to this case. Please state separately the name, address, race and occupation of any person not interviewed by you or on your behalf, but whom you intend to interview in the future about this case."

Well, I have been around a little while and I can just picture myself calling up some witness and sayiing, "I'd like to talk to you about this." By the way, are you black or white or Catholic, Protestant or Jew?" And then making a note of it and then turning that over to the government or something like that.

That's what this whole darn thing reads like.

They say, for example, "Please state the name and address of each black and Puerto Rican individual who has applied for a position of any kind with Trump Management in the past three years." Well, this doesn't charge employment discrimination on the part of Trump in hiring its management personnel — it is a fair housing proceeding. When I called Mr. Trump and read it to him, he said, "How can I do that? I couldn't tell you if the Court ordered me to answer it, because I would have thought it highly improper when we employ somebody to say, 'what is your race?'"

He said, "I don't know what their race or religion is. All I know is, if they have good references and they meet the qualifications, they get the job, and whoever our personnel people are, do that. We don't ask race." He said, "And I haven't even seen most of these people and I wouldn't know if they are black or Puerto Rican or white or Catholic, Protestant or Jew," and he said, "I would think the most improper thing in the world for me to do would be to have questions concerning a person's race or religion or something like that on employment applications when we give out jobs in or organization."

Now, when it comes to the units, oh, they want

to know things like, decreases and increases in rental rates and since January 1, 1968. You are talking about 14,000 units here. When you get down to the question of the actual 14,000 units, they ask us to tell them the number of persons per month by race making inquiry concerning the availability of an apartment between January 1, 1969 and present. We deny any discriminatory practices, and obviously the Trumps have never permitted, would never dream of permitting an application which is given out for a broker renting an apartment to say to a person, "What's your race or religion?" We would have no way in the world of knowing.

The next thing they ask us to do is to canvass our 14,000 units and findout — there are definitely a number of blacks who live in there, that we know visibly. I have taken a ride and looked at some of them and blacks walk in and out and I assume they are not there for any improper purpose and they live in the place. But they want us to go, apparently, and canvass all 14,000 of these units and find out how many blacks live there and how many non-blacks live there, and I suppose how many Puerto Ricans live there or non-Puerto Ricans.

The whole tenor of the thing seems to be offensive. If they have some proof that the Trumps have been discriminating and have applied discriminatory

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policies -- and I know there are a considerable number of blacks, we represent that to the Court, who live in these units -- but if they have some specific proof to support a complaint that discriminatory practices have been followed, all we ask them to do is not to tell us to go out and make an investigation and in so doing, note the race of every witness we interview, or every person I talk to about it, but ask them to put in a proper complaint, which advises us at least of the minimum facts, not statutory language, which they claim shows some discriminatory action by us so that we can meet that charge and say in that building in those units or on this application or in this situation it is not a fact we discriminated, and here's what happened. That's all we ask.

I would respectfully submit to your Honor the concept that a barebones complaint, without one fact in it, followed on its heels by 16 pages of interrogatories telling us to go out and find and conduct our own investigation, which would be long, expensive and, in many instances, impossible, is not the way in this country you do something like this.

So we therefore ask your Honor to hold the interrogatories in abeyance, and if we ever get to this point, we are going to ask leave to make a motion to

strike some of these, and ask your Honor to dismiss this complaint -- and if your Honor feels that total dismissal is not warranted, at least ask them to replead and give us some facts.

The government cites some cases which they say could actually justify a complaint like this. I don't think one of them that they cite is of significance insofar as this complaint is concerned, a reported case. They have been kind enough to supply us with a pile, knowing, I'm sure, the expertise of their Civil Rights Division, they have them at their fingertips and they were nice enough to mimeograph off for us a list with a table of contents of the unreported cases. I have gone through these and I don't think -- don't find one of them that supports a complaint like this. I am not going to cite the general lack.

There are, of course, somethings which say in a complaint you don't have to set forth every evidentiary detail. Your Honor has heard to the point of boredom that argument every time there is a motion for a bill of particulars before you in a criminal case. The defendant says, "I don't know anything." The government says, "They want all our evidence." And your Honor strikes a happy balance and says, "Well, tell them enough so they know of the specifics here

they are supposed to meet. But you don't have to tell them all your evidence and all of that." Okay. They cite this Connelly case with which I have some familiarity, which cuts both ways, of course. It says you don't have to tell everything but you have to tell something; you have to tell them what they are charged with and what they feel someone is supposed to have done, and I think that case cuts most heavily in our favor.

Then they go to these unreported cases. Just to talk about a few of them and not to be discriminatory myself here, I will just take them in the order in which they set them forth in their memorandum. They start with a case called the Raymond case. It is obvious from that case, your Honor, there was a wealth of detail. They don't set forth the actual complaint so I just have to piece together what the complaint might have been and the preliminary pleadings from the papers they have here.

In the Raymond case, your Honor, first of all, this was a small situation. They would say, I think, less than 40 apartments involved, not 14,000, such as we have in this case. What they say there is the land-lord publicly announced and admitted, "I will never rent a place to a black. Forget about it." And,

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furthermore, when a white family entertained some black friends of theirs, they promptly told the white family their lease was terminated and to get out of the place. I can understand a charge like that in its impropriety and fact that that should have been met.

They go then to this Palmer case, which was against the City or Township of Palmer, I think, in Ohio, and there there was a specific charge that the Township refused to go forward with a housing project, a specifically enumerated housing project to be done with Federal funds, on the grounds that this might bring about an influx of blacks into a community or area. The issue there was whether this housing project should be blocked or not then and the defendant township was specifically so charged and had the opportunity to meet the charge.

In the Smythe case, the issue was whether a single family exemption to this law applied or didn't apply.

In the Goldberg case, your Honor, they did just -the government did just what it had not done in this case: they set forth a schedule, a list of properties in which claimed discriminatory practices have been followed and enumerated lots. The issue there was whether lots were being denied to people because of

race, and they set forth a list of lots which were so involved.

As you go through this whole thing, I don't find any case or anything which says that the only facts that have to be in a complaint are the names of the defendants, and beyond that you just photostat the statute and then file a list of interrogatories and put the defendant to its proof and shift the burden-really, your Honor, what this is, is a shifting of the burden on the defendant to establish in preliminary proceedings, its innocence of a charge which has never been made specifically against it.

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I don't see what reason, in the name of fairness, candor and type of fair play, the Government should stand for, that can occasion the Government not to be willing in this case to give us some factual specifics as to when, where and how they claim there has been discriminatory practice in this case.

Having failed to do so, at this point, we ask your Honor most respectfully to dismiss this complaint or make them replead in conformity with the practice in this District, and, as far as I know, in every Court and District in the United States.

The only other motion -- I have covered the interrogatories, your Honor, and I would say we certainly do want to be heard on that, as your Honor might gather, but I would think we would allagree that is probably appropriately dealt with after we all get your Honor's disposition about how this complaint should be handled.

I had a little conversation with the very nice representative of the Government, and I don't think we will have any problem on that. They have made a motion to dismiss our counter-claim. We have sued for a hundred million dollars, which is a possibly --

THE COURT: A tidy sum.

MR. COHEN: A tidy sum, your Honor, right.

They say it is 90 percentlogic, or something, than

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anything that's been sued for in previous cases like this, and I am not prepared to dispute them factually on that.

The basis of the suit is that the action in bringing the action was unauthorized; that it is something that goes beyond an abusive process.

The Government contends that what we are really saying is -- here's what they say, they say three things, your Honor -- they say four things, they say, first of all, that our pleading is defective in that an attorney of record did not personally sign it.

And they might have me on that.

If they do, I would be willing to sign a pleading, and they might be right about that, and I would be willing to sign it.

The second objection them make, is that it is not timely, that the time to file something like this after an answer has been -- after the motion before your Honor on the complaint is disposed of, and after an answer, if that becomes necessary, is filed by us.

But it seems to me they then go on to say we have something here which is a compulsory counter-claim meaning that it must be asserted at an early stage of the proceedings, and I don't know how point two fits in with point three. If the fact is there should be

made at a later time, we would be agreeable to a severance without prejudice on their part to -- when we renew it, to raise whatever objections they want.

Now, they come to number four, which is a basic objection, and they say that the Government without its consent, which it has not as yet given, -- I am hopeful, of course, in the interest of fair play, they probably are going to advise your Honor this morning that they intend, as a matter of fairness, to give it, because they have nothing to fear insofar as any damage verdict from your Honor or a jury in this case, because their actions have been entirely proper. So I know in the spirit of fairness that now prevails, I am looking forward hopefully for such a gesture from the Government.

Absent that, they say that we would be entitled to come in here under the Federal Tort Claims Act, if there was an action by the Government officials even within the scope of their duties, which results in injury and damage to the defendants.

But they say that there are exclusions from the Federal Tort Claim Act, namely, libel, slander and abusive process, and they construe our counter-claim in this case, to amount to a contention of libel, slander and abusive process and therefore, not proscribed but not within the permissive features of the Federal

Tort Claims Act without first consent by the Government.

We don't view it that way. We say in a pleading stage, what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, and in a pleading stage, where we are now, that our counter-claim is sufficient under the lack of the Federal Tort Claims Act to spell out damage and injury, and it cannot be determined that the only damage and injury, would be libel, slander or abusive process.

It might be damage to property and damage to reputation, other than by libel and alander, and things which are not proscribed by the Act, and which do not require the consent of the Government in order to be sued.

However, if they are right on the lack of timeliness in the raising of this issue, we are perfectly agreeable to a severance as to that, and as to a renewal when, as and if an answer has to be filed in this case, with the reservation of their rights, and with an opportunity on their part to consult with what I guess all of us hope will be an Attorney General with some degree of permanence, unlike the one who signed this complaint, as to whether the Government would be willing to be sued in this action.

Your Honor has been very patient with me and I think that's all I would like to say on these motions.

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THE COURT: All right. Now, let me hear on the matter of the complaint. I take it you are going to proceed with Miss Goldweber on that?

MS. GOLDWEBER: Good morning, your Honor.

Firstly, I would like to remark that this action is
a civil action and not a criminal action. The United

States filed its complaint in this action on October

15, 1973, and alleged that the defendants have engaged
in racially discriminatory conduct with respect to the
rental of their apartments, in violation of the Fair

Housing Act.

The defendants, and if I understand their argument correctly, have moved this Court to dismiss the Government's complaint because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The United States contends to the contrary, that its allegations contained in paragraph five of the complaints specifically state a claim upon which relief can be granted by alleging, firstly, that the defendants have refused to rent apartments to persons on account of their race and color; that they have required different terms and conditions with respect to the rental of those dwellings on account of a person's race and color.

They have made discriminatory statements with

respect to the rental of these dwellings, and that they have represented their dwellings were unavailable for rental, when, in fact, such dwellings were available.

We claim in paragraph six of the complaint, that this conduct constitutes both a pattern or practice of racial discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing Act, and a denial to groups of persons of rights secured to them by the Fair Housing Act.

For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, plaintiff's allegations in the complaint are deemed admitted and the only thing that is contested, is plaintiff's right to recover under the law.

Obviously, if the United States can prove at trial, among other things, that the defendants have refused to rent apartments to persons on account of race and color, then the United States will be entitled to both affirmative and injunctive relief, pursuant to 42 USC 3613.

Now, Mr. comm has said that the other cases that we have cited in our brief, specifically pages five and six, have all pleaded evidentiary matter.

I respectfully disagree with him since each and every complaint that has been filed under the Fair Housing Act by the Attorney General, has been written in the same Section of the Government, signed by the same

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people, and all have been substantially similar, and none of them have pleaded any kind of evidentiary allegations.

Also, for the cases where this has been discussed, which are referred to on page five of the brief, they go on to say that a complaint such as this, couched as this one is in the very language of the Fair Housing Act, is sufficient because it meets the requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules, because it clearly apprises the defendants of the nature of plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon which it rests.

Accordingly, the United States respectfully urges that defendant's motion to dismiss, would be denied.

motion. I have a few questions that do arise with this complaint, and even though, as you point out, this is a civil action and not a criminal action, the fact is, it is an action brought by the United States Government, which does charge a somewhat serious course of conduct, which, if true, would be clearly in violation of fundamental national policy, which certainly imply perjorative inferences, so far as the defendants were concerned, and the like.

I have looked at your paragraph five and I realize that under our very liberal notice form of pleading permitted in civil actions that in essence what you seem to say in five, is to the defendant, "You have violated the law." And you say, in effect, "You have violated the law by refusing to rent rentals, making statements and so forth, and so to some extent" -- how does a plaintiff faced with such a complaint, deal with it? There is no allegation, as I see it, of time or place, and I notice, under Role 9, which follows Rule 8, that for the purpose of testing the sufficiency of a pleading, of averment of time and place or material, and shall be considered like all other averments, in a material matter.

The reason that I bring that up is because of other motions now pending before the Court, with respect to interrogatories served on the defendants by the plaintiff, asking for information, dating back to 1968, which I take it, was even the year of the enactment of this Act.

MS GOLDWEBER: Right.

THE COURT: And yet there is no statement of time or place in this pleading, which would enable a defendant perhaps to challenge interrogatories that go back to 1968, as not being consistent with the causes of action pleaded.

For example, while I assume that the Government does not make this charge in a capricious way and undoubtedly believes it has the proof or will certainly be able to prove these allegations, I do have some doubt, despite the array of authority which you have cited to me, and which I have examined, that I find it difficult to assimilate this case to Connolly-Gibson type situations which involved a small band of negro workers, who felt themselves discriminated against by their union.

While the Court does not set forth the exact allegations, the case is reminiscent of others that Mr. Cohn pointed out in your supplemental appendix of opinions, such as preventing the construction of one apartment house or dealing with a situation of not permitting colored people to visit white people in a particular building, have a certain definitionabout them that make it possible for a defendant so charged, let us say, to deal with them in a reasonable manner.

I am raising this question not capriciously either, because we have many administrative agencies coming before this Court, and a very recent case brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission, seeking the same kind of relief that you seek, that is to say, affirmative injunctive relief, in which, when you look at the complaint, no defendant could complain about it

because it tells him very definitively what he is being charged with, in effect, having violate the Securities Exchange Act, specifically, definitely, and this, as I say, may be doing more than is required.

But all I am pointing out is that I think
Mr. Cohn's complaint about the complaint is not altogether
without basis. I am not certain that it is an answer
to say that he can get all these particulars by interrogatories when part of his job is to resist your
interrogatories on the basis of the complaint that
sets no time limit, does not give any particulat
location of building, or what nature of statements were
made or what particular practice.

I am wondering whether the Government in fairness to a defendant, doesn't have more of an obligation than does the private litigant versus the private litigant, to inform someone it sues in this manner — and as I say, sues in this particular area, which, although not criminal, might well be because we know there are criminal statutes, that persons who conspire to deprive others of civil rights, may well be charged criminally, under 18 US 241, for example.

That includes invading a psychiatrist's office and looking in his file -- you just saw that in the

paper yesterday. So I must say that many of these cases you cite, I feel do not perceive the problems in an area such as New York City, where you are dealing with a landlord of not one hundred apartments, but fourteen thousand apartments, a far flung, widespread organization; that something in the way of a definition should be conveyed in the Government's initial pleading, so that proper interrogatories might even be served on that basis, and issues more readily brought into sharper focus.

Ar the moment, as I see it, this is a very broad, undefined picture, of a pattern, and the defendant is saying "I can't even see the pattern."

MS. GOLDWEBER: I would like to respond to that.

THE COURT: I understand and I am perfectly happy to have you do so.

po you feel or don't you feel—there is some
justice to the complaint that in this type of situation
there ought to be a more definitive depiciton — and
I am not saying evidentiary facts — but something
that says beginning at such and such a time, in buildings
located at so-and-so — they might even be separate
causes of action, I don't know whether that would be
required — so that the proof could be dealt with in
terms of more definitively stated claims that appear in

this document.

As I say, I would be perfectly willing to supply you with the latest SEC production, to illustrate what I mean when I say that this would not bring about the sort of controversy we have here, since it so clearly lays out for the defendant in that case, what they have done wrong.

MS. GOLDWEBER: Well, your Honor, in this case,
I respectfully have a bit of a different interpretation.
I think, first of all, one of the defendants, Donald
Trump, and defendant's counsel, they have both filed
affidavits with this Court, denying that there was any
discriminatory conduct on the part of any of the defendants, to their knowledge, and the Government's charges
are totally unfounded.

THE COURT: Of course, that is all conclusory, isn't it? It is conclusions opposed to conclusions; I deny what you say, but I frame my denial in an affirmative way, rather than in a negative way.

MS. GOLDWEBER: I understand that, but I seem to believe that if they had done that, then they would have been able to answer the complaint and that's all they would have to do.

THE COURT: From the standpoint of dealing, let's say, with your interrogatories, how can they successfully

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object to interrogatories going back to 1968, if they don't know whether or not you may be seeking a broader scope of information, time-wise, chronologically, than would be demanded by the allegations of your compaint?

I don't say that those are necessarily limiting of discovery, but very often, Courts will, when confronted with objections, to interrogatories, look at the complaint in terms of time, and, for example, one of the things that occurs to me, doesn't a statute of limitations ever run against a claim such as this?

MS. GOLDWEBER: We are not allowed to prove racial discrimintation, based on things that happened prior to the effective date of the Act, but we can bring in evidence to --

THE COURT: I can understand the probative value of prior conduct, on issues of intent and design, and so forth; I understand that.

That is a different question.

We are getting into the area of evidence, and, of course, I understand that discovery is designed to enable parties to call upon the parties -- call upon the other parties to produce information, even leading to the discovery of evidence, as well as evidence, in order to support a claim or defense against a claim.

These are commonplace. I am sure you understand

that.

When you are talking about a large, complex, fourteen thousand apartments — and again, where it does occur to the Court that there are certain laws which prohibit inquiries directed to race, for example, I don't believe in its employment policy—I am not passing on it — Iwas suprised to see that interrogatory in this case, I will be frank to say that, but I believe it would be against the law to require in an employment situation as to the race of any particular person. I believe so. That is my understanding.

MR. SCHWELD: Could I say one thing about that, your Honor. We have done a lot of employment work.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SCHWELD: The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission requires each employer of over 15 or 20 employees, I believe, to keep a racial census because it has helped the EPOC in enforcing Title 7.

THE COURT: That is now a new policy since the enactment of that Act, as I recall it. But, for example, here in New York, it was against the law for any employment agency to inquire as to the race of any person trying for a job. I understand that supremacy demands that the Federal law take precedence, but there

may be, and I don't know when the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act -- is this under regulations of the
Commission?

MR. SCHWELD: Yes, your Honor, pursuant to Title 7, which we have had since '64.

THE COURT: I don't know when these regulations were adopted. They may be comparatively recent.

MR. SCHWELD: I don't mean to interrupt my colleague, your Honor, but it has been about seven or eight years ago, at least.

THE COURT: It is that long ago?

MR. SCHWELD: Yes, sir.

that that may crop up in terms of the way this case appears in the light of what I have seen in the papers before me. I am simply mentioning these things to point out again the interests that can be served by some attempt at definition rather than simply a charge that you have violated the law, which is the way I have to read this complaint.

MS. GOLDWEBER: I think there are two separate issues that are involved here. In response to the interrogatories, in which we ask for fairly detailed information, if your Honor will still entertin defendant's objection that they could file with their answers to

these interrogatories, then we will be prepared to defend each and every interrogatory, and if your Honor felt at that time that we did not defend it well enough, then the defendants would not be ordered to answer that interrogatory.

The fact is we have sued people, filed complaints across the country against a lot of defendants who are in control of many units, ten, twelve thousand units, and in all of those complaints, as I said before, they were very similar to this, and in the Raymond complaint, which Mr. Cohen referred to, it did not allege specific facts in the complaint, and none of the complaints have.

The fact which is not really at issue here today is that we ask for -- we allege employment relief in the complaint, and we inquire about it in the interrogatories. Well, there have been three cases that have held that employment relief, once the Government has proven a Fair Housing case, and the Court has ordered relief, they have been entitled to also get employment relief as an incident to the housing affirmative relief they have been able to obtain.

We are certainly ready and willing, if we are served with interrogatories, or depositions are taken of our witnesses, to give any kind of proper evidence

that we don't object to to the defendants, to apprise them more clearly of what is happening.

I believe that because they have filed these affidavits denying it, that they can just deny the complaint, and their motion for more definite statement, which requests specific facts, as to the names, dates and persons involved in the alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act, is just the kind of thing that a motion for more definite statements should not be utilized for.

(Continued on next page.)

THE COURT: Well, I understand that interrogatories are demanding in terms of specifity, and that might have been better remedy for defendants to seek.

I think, however, what concerns me is that you get a complaint like this followed by a fairly exhaustive demand for interrogatory answers by the Government, that is on the part of the Government, there is no time period, no time frame possible to determine from the face of the complaint as to whether such an enermous request going back six years would be justified, at least in the first instance, without some more of a showing that what was asked for was truly relevant to the issues that were going to be litigated.

MS. GOLDWEBER: Could I suggest that one thing —
the Court's purpose is served as well if the defendants
knew he filed a denial, general denial to the complaint,
and then filed with this Court, either a motion for
protective order to give them further time to object
or an answer to the interrogatories, and then filed
their answers or objections, and then each specific
thing that is contained in that interrogatory, so we
would understand exactly what everyone was objecting
to, and it wouldn't be just sort of a vast array of
things, but we would know specifically what interroga—

United States would be able to try to defend that specific interrogatory or however many there are.

THE COURT: As I say, I recognize that the purpose of the rule was to try to do away with the unnecessary focussing on pleadings and papers and get down to the merits of the claim. I heartily believe in and will endorse that principle. I would be inclined here to give the defendants an opportunity to serve upon the Government a set of interrogatories seeking definition, without depriving the Government of any opportunity to object to anything about those that they might think should be objected to, and I would, in effect, deny the motion to dismiss the complaint with that understanding, that you will have an opportunity within —

What would be a reasonable time in which you could put together something like that?

MR. SCHWELD: You mean to answer them or to file them?

THE COURT: To file them. How much time would it take to file them?

MR. SCHWELD: Mr. Cohn says 45 days to file them. I would think we could file them informally if we write down what he wants to know and then answer

them in twenty days.

THE COURT: Could you get up a set in two weeks?

MR. COHN: Sure.

THE COURT: Two weeks. I am pointing out to you, this is not intended to be an exhaustive draft upon the Government, but rather a preliminary attempt to obtain some more definition of matters, let us say, covered in five. I think that seems to be the sensitive paragraph of the complaint, as a starter. That would be, of course, without prejudice to further interrogatory work or discovery work of one kind or another as time goes on.

I would deny the motion to dismiss the complaint on that basis.

MR. COHN: That would be a very fair disposition, your Honor. Within two weeks, we will file in effect, interrogatories cast in the form of a Bill of Particulars to try to define some of these things.

MR. SCHWELD: Does that include the more definite statement motion, your Honor, also?

THE COURT: Yes. It would dispose of that as well. Obviously, yes.

With respect to the Government's demand for interrogatories, I would, assuming that Government is willing, extend a reasonable period of time to the

defendants to object, because, apparently, they have been operating on a misunderstanding here as to how the Federal procedure operates.

I would expect that, to the extent possible, any interrogatory not objected to, would be answered within a reasonable time, so that there wouldn't be a complete delay in progress.

In other words, I assume you will make a selection of those interrogatories that you feel you have a good objection to, and you urge that, and that as to others, an attempt will be made to answer them.

Now, let me pointout to you, I believe it to be the rule, that you don't have to answer something you can't answer. You are at liberty to state that.

There is also a problem of burden which you may consider raising, that is to say the making of revelations, but it may be that you will then be faced with the Government's demand for productions, the right to inspect and copy your records.

That may be an alternative, since the Government has its resources, and I take it you would contend that your client's resources are somewhat limited.

MS. GOLDWEBER: We have made that offer in the interrogatories, that if defendants didn't want to compile all this information, we would, at their

convenience come in, and inspect their documents.

MR. COHN: YourHonor, I think we all get your reasoning, and I think it is a very fair disposition on the matter. Should we try to agree on an order fixing time limits?

THE COURT: Could you work that out?

MR. COHN: Sure. I don't see why we can't.

We will take the two weeks suggested by your Honor,

and consider that a firm date by which we serve

interrogatories on the Government. They will want how

long to answer?

THE COURT: Why don't you work those things out?

MR. COHN: We will work those out and submit
an order to you that will provide for that.

A certain period of time after they answer the interrogatories, so we have a little better idea what this complaint -- what periods of time this complaint covers, and all of that, then shortly thereafter we will answer those interrogatories we can, and move against those, we don't think we ought to answer.

What does this do to a formal answer to the complaint, may that be deferred?

THE COURT: No. I would suggest that you answer the complaint as best you can. However, I would suggest that you don't include your counter-claim, because I am

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going to dismiss it.

MR. COHN: We won't include the counter-claim.

THE COURT: I have to say that there are simply too many hurdles in that counter-claim, not the least of which is, no matter how you slice it, Mr. Cohn, it still comes out as a claim of tortuous conduct.

It certainly fits squarely, in my judgment, within the framework of the Federal Tort Claims Act --

MR. COHN: Which would require consent --

THE COURT: Yes, it would, under 2680. It is, in my judgment, an accepted type of claim, and if the party consented to be sued within the framework of that Act, as I say, I think you would be wasting time and paper, and diverting yourself from what I consider to be the real issues you have to meet if you do so.

The Court is very mindful of the importance of the interests involved here to both sides, the Government -- the Attorney General has a job to do, and it is not discretionary, it is imposed by law.

If your clients are violating the law, it is, -- it is his duty to take action. On the other hand, if you believe they are not, it is your duty to do something about it.

I am giving you that opportunity.

MR. COHN: I appreciate it very much. we all understand the purport of your Honor's views, and

we will try to draft an order covering all these things and submit it to your Honor.

THE COURT: Fine. Is there anything that has not been covered here?

MR. BRACHTL: Just one question with respect to the dismissal of the counter-claim. Do you wish an order?

THE COURT: That could be included. Whatever order you submit could include that. If you wish it separately, I see it as sort of an anomalous document, it sort of walked into court, it wasn't an answer, it was a counter-claim.

MR. COHN: What we will do probably is just omit it from an answer, and they don't have to do anything.

MR. BRACHTL: We would suggest, your Honor, that would be appropriately amended, and because the counter-claim cannot be asserted except in a pleading, and, hence, the pleading which has been asserted, contains no --

THE COURT: I think Mr. Cohn gets the point.

It drops out of the picture entirely, and he will serve a proper answer to the existing complaint the best he can. But he will have the opportunity to frame the questions in preliminary interrogatories, if you want to call them that, to give you an opportunity so that you may amend your answer if you think that is called for. Do you understand?

MR. COHN: Perfectly, your Honor. 2 MR. BRACHTL: We will submit a short form order 3 with respect to the dismissal. 4 MR. COHN: Why don't we agree on a total order 5 and just submit it? MR. SCHWELD: We have an order which you might 6 7 conwider signing on the motion --8 MR. COHN: Why don't we submit one order? 9 I think we are looking for another press release 10 or something --11 MS. GOLDWEBER: No, we are not. 12 THE COURT: I have your proposed order here. 13 I would believe that the order ought to encompass what 14 we have discussed here this morning. If you wish a separate order on the counter-claim, that is immaterial. 15 So far as you are all here together, the counter-16 claim stands dismissed. 17 MR. COHN: May we do this, could we have an 18 understanding from here on in -- and I think we will 19 probably get agreement to this -- that they stop putting 20 out press releases and try this case in court? 21 THE COURT: Mr. Cohn, having served as a 22 United States Attorney -- and I think you were an 23 Assistant -- you know that the Government, unlike a 24 private litigant, does have to keep the public informed. 25

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I must say that I have to agree that I think the document they issued was most chaste, and under the circumstances, it is just one of the things that you have to grin and bear when you are a litigant.

On the other hand, there is such a thing as fair trial as well as free press, and consequently, I would hope that the Government will not be putting out anything which will appair or prejudice the rights of these defendants to a fair trial of the issues involved in this case.

MR. COHN: They have indicated to me by a nod there will be no press release.

MR. SCHWELD: Wait a minute. He said the motion about a definite statement. I think your Honor is acquainted with what you do when a judgment comes out in a case, your Honor; it is usually released to the press when a complaint is drawn, but I think, as your Honor said, this was extremely chaste.

THE COURT: You don't have to apologize.

MR. SCHWELD: I am not.

MR. COHN: I indicate we are going to try this in court and not in the press. Is that fair?

MR. SCHWELD:. It is fair.

MR. BRACHTL: But it is not a limitation upon informing the public.

MR. COHN: Prior to a determination.

Are you planning any press releases on any of these proceedings?

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. COHN: You are not planning further press releases, is that right?

MR. SCHWELD: If there is a judgment in the case at some time, it will be given to the press.

As to the judgment whether the counter-claim has been released, I don't know whether the public information will press release that or not. I am not going to give any assurance they won't. When they brought this hundred million dollar counter-claim, they definitely wanted mentioned that it was dismissed.

MR. COHN: I want it mentioned that the Judge stated that we have the opportunity, if you are going to start this again -- these people have to rent, your Honor, and do business in this community. If they are going to start parading around, stating that the counter-claim is dismissed or something, I am going to have to start with the fact that your Honor has given us leave to file interrogatories against the complaint, which was not --

THE COURT: Let me put it this way, Mr. Cohn.
Unfortunately for your clients, because they are so

large and well known, they become objects of newsworthy interest. For all I know, the press is here right now. But I do think that so far as the Government is concerned, it understands at this point, now that the matter is in litigation, it has announced what has occurred and I assume it will await that blessed day, one way or the other, when they win the lawsuit, as they confidently think they are going to do, you see, and that we won't have any intervening communiques between opposing capitols.

MR. COHN: That's fine, your Honor.

MR. BRACHTL: All of this must be in context, of course, of the continuing interest of the press, and inquiries which are made, which require, I think, as a public obligation, a response.

THE COURT: Mr. Brachtl, if your fellows upstairs would apply your time and attention to the prosecution of the business of the office and let the press ferret it out, that would perhaps resolve the problem.

MR. COHN: One further thing, I would appreciate it, if your Honor would hold the orders and sign everything at the same time.

THE COURT: When I see new orders come in, I will take care of them.

One thing I would remind you of, and in this

District and in the Southern District, too, we have a local rule, where objections to interrogatories are made, it is the responsibility of the lawyers to first try and iron out their differences, and only plague the Court, which has enough to do in this District, so much larger than the Southern District, and with so many fewer Judges --

MR. COHN: But by their competence, they make up in quality for what is lacked in quantity.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Cohn. But that won't get you anywhere.

You are under obligation to try and discuss the matter --

MR. COHN: As long as they promise not to talk about a consent decree, we will have a meeting.

MR. SCHWELD: We love to litigate the case, your Honor.

MR. COHN: Thank you for your time.

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